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The four schools of Islamic law
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The Medinan Caliphate The thirty or so years following the death of the Prophet were of crucial importance to the subsequent history of Islam. During this period - known as the Medinan Caliphate - four successive Caliphs ruled the Muslim lands from the town of Medina. The English word 'caliph' derives from the Arabic term khalifa, meaning 'successor'. The first four Caliphs - Abu Bakr, 'Umar, 'Uthman and Ali - are known by Sunni Muslims as Al-Khulafa' Al-Rashidun, the 'rightly guided successors' of Muhammad. It was during this period that the phase of expansion and conquest began. But above all, it was during the Medinan Caliphate that the schism within Islam arose, precisely around the question of the Caliphate, a notion which is present but not clearly defined in the Koran. It is a schism which to this day frequently gives rise to harsh conflicts within the community of believers. Muhammad's death was followed by a moment of great confusion, because the infant Muslim community had no explicit indication as to how to elect a new political and religious leader. According to the doctrines expounded by Shiite Muslims since the second century after the Hijra (8th century AD), Muhammad's designated successor was his cousin Ali, who was also married to the Prophet's daughter Fatima and was the father of his two grandsons, Hassan and Husayn. According to this view, the Companions of the Prophet are held to have ignored his will by appointing one of their number, Abu Bakr, as the first Caliph. Sunni Islam, which coalesced slightly later (3rd century AH / 9th century AD), hesitated before taking a position on the question because it remained largely dependent on Shiite accounts of the succession. The complex politics of the first three centuries of Islam constantly interfered with the historical record. Gradually, the counter-thesis of Abu Bakr's designation by the Prophet took form, in opposition to the Shiite thesis of Ali's designation. In fact, it would seem that Muhammad did not appoint a successor - an act which would have been contrary to tribal norms, whereby the dominant representatives of a group settle the question of the succession amongst themselves. The choice of the first Caliph is thought to have been made, in accordance with custom, by just such a conclave. Initially, in any case, a majority of Muslims agreed with the appointment of Abu Bakr, who was not only one of Muhammad's companions but also his father-in-law. As Caliph, he suppressed tribal revolts and began the northwards push of the Muslim armies. But his rule was brief, since he died in 634, just two years after Muhammad - but not before designating 'Umar, another of the Prophet's fathers-in-law, as his successor. 'Umar duly became the second Caliph, and during his ten year rule he encouraged and gave an organised form to what was at the outset a largely spontaneous drive to conquest, sweeping through much of the Persian and Byzantine empires. 'Umar also began to organise the financial, judicial and military administration of the emerging Muslim empire. He had his successor, 'Uthman, designated by a sort of electoral college, before dying at the hand of a Christian slave. The third Caliph, 'Uthman, was another companion of the Prophet and one of his sons-in-law. Less energetic than 'Umar, he allowed serious dissent to arise before being assassinated in dubious circumstances in 656 AD. Unrest was encouraged by quarrels over the redistribution of revenue raised through taxes, to which Muhammad's young widow Aisha and his cousin and son-in-law Ali were party. Ali it was who became the fourth Caliph, ruling for five years until 661 AD. In the meantime, the Muslims had become the masters of a sizeable empire - an entirely new situation for men who had grown up in tribal micro-societies. Under the fourth Caliph, the tensions and internal conflicts which arose from this sudden social transformation resulted in a five-year tribal war which was later dubbed Al-Fitna Al-Kubra ('the great upheaval' or 'the great test'). This came to represent a cultural and religious trauma of great symbolic importance even down to the present day, representing the end of the ideal and mythical unity of the prophetic period. Ali's reign was a perpetual struggle between the various factions, developing into open civil war. This struggle culminated at the Battle of Siffin, at which Ali's forces faced those of Mu'awiya, governor of Syria and a relative of Ali's predecessor 'Uthman, who held Ali responsible for 'Uthman's murder. In a skillful manoeuvre which was to become famous, the Syrian troops attached pages of the Koran to the end of their lances as a symbol of their refusal to fight a fratricidal battle. As a result, Ali was forced to abandon the battle and accept arbitration - a decision which caused splits among his supporters and ultimately led the most virulent among them to assassinate him. The murder of Ali brought the period of the orthodox Caliphs to an end. It also set the seal on the famous antagonism, which persists until this day, between Sunni and Shiite Muslims (nowadays respectively about 90% and 10% of all followers of Islam). The Medinan Caliphate, which lasted 32 years, no doubt succumbed to its inability to manage the social revolution imposed on it by its territorial conquests to the satisfaction of the Arabian tribes which made up the politically active forces of the time. However, it was during this period that the title of Commander of the Faithful (Amir Al-Mu'minin) appeared. It was allegedly first applied to the Caliph 'Umar, and in any case all later Caliphs bore the title, as a mark of their power. If a Medinan Caliph did pretend to such a rank, this would mean that he had attempted to assume on a permanent basis the kind of authority that tribal society would have refused him in normal circumstances - an early sign of the political mutations that were to follow.
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The Ummayads Al-Fitna Al-Kubra, 'the great upheaval', put an end to the Medinan Caliphate, and Mu'awiya became the first Ummayad Caliph, with his capital in Damascus. The designation 'Ummayad' comes from Umayya, the name of the ancestor of Mu'awiya's clan, which had been one of the more powerful pagan clans in Mecca. Mu'awiya's father, having long opposed Muhammad, shrewdly negotiated the surrender of Mecca with the Prophet when this could no longer be avoided. Once elected to the Caliphate, Mu'awiya was able to reestablish tribal consensus, in particular by winning the allegiance of Hassan, Ali's eldest son and the grandson of the Prophet. But at the same time, he seems to have been one of the first to understand that tribal methods of exercising power had to give way to a new politics on the scale of an empire which had by then grown to take in an area stretching from North Africa to the eastern borders of Greater Iran. At his initiative, a dynasty was established that followed the administrative models of the previously existing Middle Eastern kingdoms. In order to effect the transformation from tribal chief to king, the Caliph had, one way or another, to base his power in a direct relationship with the sacred and the divine. This is what seems to have taken place when, in a clear break with tribal representations and terminology of power, Mu'awiya had himself proclaimed 'Caliph of God' (Khalifat Allah). Abu Bakr, the first Caliph, had borne the title of Successor of the Messenger of God (Khalifat Rasul Allah). The new, Ummayad title did not, of course, mean that the Caliph intended to present himself as a new prophet, but rather that he would henceforth rule as the guarantor of God's binding commandments to mankind. Mu'awiya's second major innovation was to designate, during his lifetime, his own successor. His choice went to his son, Yazid, who duly went on to become the second Ummayad Caliph. This decision of Mu'awiya's marks the historical moment at which the dynastic nature of the Caliphate - hitherto unknown and, indeed, quite foreign to the old system - was first established. Once again, this was a break with tribal custom, according to which the elder male members of a lineage (generally the brothers of the deceased) take precedence over the sons in a succession within a family - the pattern followed in modern-day Saudi Arabia, for example. Later Islamic dynasties, having renewed the link with this ancient tribal heritage, constantly oscillated between father-to-son and brother-to-brother succession, depending on the balance of forces prevailing at any given moment. Initially, these first signs of emerging dynastic rule were felt to be so intolerable that they provoked another major war, known as al-fitna al-thaniya ('the second upheaval'). Husayn, son of Ali and the Prophet's second grandson, who had become the head of his family after the death of Hassan, refused to recognise Yazid when he succeeded Mu'awiya's as Caliph, and lead a desperate revolt in Iraq against Ummayad power. Hassan and two hundred of his supporters died in battle at Karbala, southern Iraq, on 10th Muharram 61 AH (October 10, 680 AD). Under the Ummayad Caliphate, the family of the Prophet, as the natural source for all candidates for power, was given an extensive and, in many ways, tribal definition. It took in all branches of the Prophet's lineage, and the implicit assumption was that the candidate who came out on top in any succession struggle would do so with God's assistance and was ipso facto the chosen successor. And it was on this basis that the Abbassids (descendants of the Prophet's uncle, Abbas) later prepared their conquest of power, in competition with other branches of the family. The Abbassid branch overthrew the Ummayads in the middle of the 2nd century AH (8th century AD) and shifted the seat of power to Iraq, where the second Abbassid Caliph built Baghdad, not far from the site of ancient Babylon.
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In opposition to the Ummayad title of Caliph of God, invented by the founder of the Ummayad dynasty Mu'awiya, arose the title and concept of 'Imam'. Sunni Muslims are, historically speaking, the inheritors of those who rallied to Mu'awiya, the successful rival of the Prophet's cousin and son-in-law Ali. They recognise the legitimacy of the first four Caliphs, holding that the leader of the community of believers must:
Shiites, for their part, follow the original supporters of Ali in holding that only the descendents of Ali and Fatima (one of the Prophet's daughters) are authorised to lead the community as Imams, or 'guides of the Umma'. The qualities of an Imam are not clearly defined. In periods of messianic ferment, the Imam may also acquire the title of Mahdi (literally 'the guided one'). The murder of Ali, and the subsequent death of his two sons at the hands of the Syrians at the battle of Karbala (680 AD), are still commemorated by Shiite Muslims as a tragedy, in which Muhammad's direct filiation was extinguished. This original drama, the minority status of Shiism and the repeated persecutions to which it has been subjected have imparted a suffering yet militant edge to this branch of Islam. After Ali, the Shiites bestowed the title of Imam on eleven descendents of the Prophet. The last of them (i.e. the Twelfth Imam) died at the age of eight. Shiite tradition has it that he disappeared and remains hidden from human sight until he reappears at the end of time. When he does reappear, it will be as the Mahdi, who will liberate the world. Both Shiism and Sunnism have their own internal divisions, with disputes between sub-sects of each sometimes even more violent than the fundamental disagreement between the two main branches of Islam. It would be far too reductionist to suggest that questions of dogma alone explain these animosities.
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Because of its geographical spread, with a wide range of historical and contemporary realities, the young Muslim empire ran up against various practical problems, to which universally applicable answers had to be found. Finding such answers had economic, social and political implications. Islamic law (shari'a) was elaborated gradually, taking the Koran as its basic and intangible source - although jurisprudence has from time to time prevented the application of measures that were difficult to apply. Hence, for example, during a famine the Caliph 'Umar suspended the rule whereby thieves were to have a hand cut off, and in order to perpetuate such tolerance later jurists have argued that the masses as a whole are under-nourished. Since the Koran could not stipulate everything, the jurists of the first few centuries of Islam looked to the example of Muhammad and his companions for other elements in support of legislation. In addition, they introduced certain other principles - consensus on a given subject between scholars (ijma'), the public interest (istislah), personal interpretation (ra'y), reasoning by analogy (qiyas) - all of which have been widely used, and almost as widely contested. Muhammad had anticipated the multiplicity of points of view with regard to a given question when he said that "the diversity of opinions in my community is a sign of divine mercy". But another of his sayings indicated that there had to be an end to debate at a certain point: "Never will my community agree on an error." This invitation to debate presupposes that respect for the same beliefs must lead to the same results and that delving deeper into the fundamental principles, differences over points of detail aside, can only strengthen Islam. Anyone who has visited a teaching mosque will have noticed that the internal courtyard is square. The student of the religious sciences will know that each side of the square is reserved for one of the four madhhabs, or schools of divine law. These schools, which crystalised mainly around questions of method and procedure, are named after their founders. In order of age, they are as follows :
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The Hanafite school Derived from the teachings of Abu Hanifa Al-Nu'man Ibn Thabit (d. 767 AD), it gives priority to personal judgement and to treating each case individually in the interests of finding the best possible solution from the point of view of equity and of the customs of the day. Predominates these days in many non-Arab countries (India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, Turkey, the Balkans).
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The Malikite school Drawing on the teachings of the Imam Malik Ibn Anas (d. 795 AD in Medina), it tends to seek consensus amongst scholars and ascribes great importance to custom and public utility. The classic example of the way in which the Malikite school applies Islamic law is the case of an enemy army holding Muslim hostages. The principle of public utility demands that the hostages be sacrificed if this is necessary to save the community as a whole. These days, the followers of the Malikite school are to be found in North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and the Persian Gulf.
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The Shafi'ite school Drawing on the doctrines of the Imam Muhammad Ibn Idriss Al-Shafi'i (767 - 820 AD), this school systematises the use of the sources of law, ruling out personal opinion and prioritising the consensus among religious scholars of all epochs. Today, the Shafi'ite school thrives in southern Arabia, Bahrain, the Malay archipelago, East Africa, Daghestan and some parts of central Asia; and it is predominant in Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon.
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The Hanbalite school Flowing from the teachings of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (855 - 945 AD), this school is strongly opposed to all forms of innovation and rationalisation, favours a return to the traditional sources of Islamic law and is hostile to the very idea of speculative theology and Sufi esotericism. It is mainly present in the Arabian peninsula. From an orthodox point of view, these schools of legal thought are the result of an effort to understand and interpret the Koran and the Sunna. Following the completion of their system, the doors of interpretation (in Arabic ijtihad, a word which is etymologically linked to the idea of effort) are held to be closed once and for all. But to be complete, mention should be made of one more legal school, which is followed by Shiite Muslims:
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The Imamite (or Ja'farite) school Based on the doctrines of Ja'far Al-Sadiq (d. 765 AD), this is seen as the fifth school. Like the other four, it recognises the same basic sources of law - the Koran and the Sunna - but it limits the recourse to consensus and precedent in favour of the uncontested authority of the Imams. The Imamite school is present in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan and some former Soviet republics. In conclusion, a few general remarks can be made concerning all five schools. First of all, it should be remembered that they are not religious sects but bodies of scholarly opinion on the application of Islamic law. Just as more than one of the schools may coexist within one Muslim country, there is nothing to prevent an individual Muslim from moving from one school to another. Secondly, the main differences between them centre on the role that is to be given to individual interpretation. Thus, within a single legal system, there is a wide range of views on the importance of reason and personal opinion. Law in contemporary Arab states tends to combine "positive" dispositions and clauses borrowed from one or more of the schools. Even countries which impose the strict application of the shari'a (Islamic law) cannot do without interpretation altogether.
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Two hundred years after the death of Muhammad, the Arab-Muslim world was still a cultural, religious and linguistic whole. Politically, however, it was divided. From east to west, the Abbassid, Fatimid and Umayyad caliphates, with their seats in Baghdad, Cairo and Cordova, ruled over three main zones : the first covering Iran and southern Iraq ; the second, Egypt, Syria and western Arabia; and the third, the Maghreb and Muslim Spain. Neither their borders nor their subdivisions were fixed, however. As of the 10th century, political developments hastened the break-up of the Arab-Muslim world, with numerous small political entities emerging for varying lengths of time. Rather than attempting a detailed description of all these multiple dynasties, we shall content ourselves with drawing the outlines of the process of fragmentation. The various dynasties had a paradoxical side to them, and shared a common ambition. In order to hold onto power, they built or occupied cities, while relying heavily on the countryside, since their survival depended on agriculture, trade and industry. The desire to hold onto power also led them to build alliances and surround themselves with foreign courtiers, guards and ministers - who in turn coveted the advantages of the throne and, not infrequently, turned against their lords and masters.. Thus, in Baghdad, the Seljuks (Sunni Turks, from whose ranks the greater part of the army was drawn) came to rule in the place of the Abbassid caliphs, assuming the title of sultan (literally, 'the holder of power'). Their rule lasted from the middle of the 11th century until the end of the 12th. In the 13th century, the Turkish and Mongol tribes of Central Asia swept through what had been the Abbassid empire and laid waste to Baghdad, before converting to Islam in their turn. In Egypt, Salah Al-Din Al-Ayyubi (or Saladin as he is known in the West), a military chieftain of Kurdish origin, overthrew the Fatimids in 1171 AD, won new lands for Sunni Islam in his battles against the old princes as well as the Crusaders. His dynasty, the Ayyubids, reigned over Egypt (to 1252), Syria and western Arabia. Threatened by the invading Mongols in the 13th century, Saladin's descedents deployed slave troops from the Caucasus known as mamluks (literally 'the owned'). But the Mamluk commanders ended up deposing the Ayyubids and went on to conquer new territories, including the holy places of the Hijaz. The Mamluk military elite reigned supreme until 1517. In Cordova, the Umayyad caliphate broke up into small kingdoms during the first half of the 11th century, making it possible for the Christian principalities to the north to attempt to reconquer the whole of Spain. This reconquest was, however, blocked for a considerable time by the rise of two dynamic Muslim dynasties among the Berber populations of North Africa : first the Almoravids and then the Almohads (both hailing originally from southern Morocco). The empire established by the latter in the early 12th century, covered at its high point (1160-1230) all of Muslim Spain and the Maghreb, from Morocco to Tunisia. However, under the onslaught of the Reconquista, its forced conversions and mass expulsions, the Arabic-speaking population of Spain, Muslims and Jews alike, were forced to take refuge in North Africa. Granada, the last outpost of Muslim Spain, fell in 1492, and just over a century later the King of Spain expelled all remaining Muslims from his territory. The borders of the Arab states varied wildly under the effect of military campaigns and commercial rivalry (fuelled by Venice and Genoa). But in the East, in the marches between Anatolia and the Byzantine Empire, a new and unexpected power was rising: the Ottoman Turks, who, in 1453, took Constantinople and renamed it Istanbul. The nascent Ottoman Empire posed as the protector of the world of Islam, and cast down a challenge to the previously existing Muslim dynasties, whose downfall it thereby hastened. In the 16th century, in the space of less than sixty years, the Ottomans defeated the Mamluks, conquered Egypt, the Levant, Yemen, Iraq and most of the Maghreb (except Morocco), establishing a trans-continental Empire that was to last, in one form or another, until the end of the First World War.
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